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Reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) has been
identied as a cost eective element of the post-Kyoto strategy to achieve long-term climate
objectives. The success of REDD depends primarily on the design and implementation of
a nancial mechanism that provides land-holders sucient incentives to participate in a
REDD scheme. This paper proposes relational contracting as a more appropriate framework
for analyzing proposed REDD incentive regimes rather than that of complete contracting
enforcement because relational contracting relies upon mutual self-enforcement in a repeated
transaction framework, which better suits the stylized facts of REDD. We characterize the
optimal REDD relational contract and provide the parameters under which self-enforcement
is sustainable. The optimal payment scheme suggests that all payments should be made
contingent on the carbon osets delivered. Thus, the optimal contract does not observe any
xed ex ante payment. Self-enforcement is more dicult to sustain the higher the cost of
forest conservation is relative to the value of the carbon osets from the contract. Necessary
extensions to the relational contracting model are also discussed.
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21 Introduction
Deforestation and forest degradation account for about 5.8 billion tons of carbon dioxide
(CO2) released into the atmosphere each year, representing approximately twenty percent
of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Holloway and Giandomenico, 2009). The potential
reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been present in
the global debate under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) as a major component to mitigate global climate change and meet the long-
term climate objectives. However, previous initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol contained
few incentives for reforestation and none for forest conservation. Furthermore, developing
countries were excluded from REDD initiatives primarily because of concerns about the
eectiveness of monitoring and enforcement of carbon reductions in those countries.
Despite these facts there is recognition that a successful reduction of emissions in-
volves large-scale mitigation eorts from the global community, and that developing countries
should be included in the REDD strategy as they control an important share of the global
forest. Moreover, deforestation and degradation is only marginally protable, therefore re-
ducing emissions from forest conservation may be more cost-eective than other mitigation
alternatives while it can lead to additional benets such as positive impacts in biodiversity
and on economic development (Angelsen, 2008, Sohngen and Beach, 2008).
Nevertheless, the success of REDD in a post-Kyoto protocol regime depends primarily
on the design and implementation of a nancial mechanism that is feasible and eective in
providing the right incentives to land-holders to manage forests in a sustainable manner that
contributes to climate goals. Designing REDD contracts involve not only properly rewarding
those who reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (DD) but must also
consider technical issues such as permanence of carbon osets and equitable distribution of
payments as well as nancial and institutional issues including delegation, verication and
3enforcement of contracts.
While such contracts may be crucial in implementing REDD policies, little is known
about how such contracts can be structured to maximize the likelihood of seller participation
and performance, particularly for long-term contracts featuring credit-constrained sellers in
environments where contracts may be dicult to monitor and enforce. Unfortunately there
is limited extant research to guide the formulation of such contracts. Furthermore, the bulk
of contract theory has been developed for situations in which contracts are perfectly en-
forceable and involve only one-time interactions. This paper encapsulates these factors and
proposes a relational contracting approach as a new framework to examine the implementa-
tion of REDD contracts. Because the variety of institutional frameworks present in the many
countries where REDD contracts are potentially implemented, self-enforcing contracts are
more desirable to overcome dierent legal systems, enforcement structures and third party
veriability. If the optimal contract is self-enforcing, providers of carbon sinks must perform
because the contract is structured in a way where contractual performance (forest conserva-
tion) is in their personal best interest. Then, participants privately enforce the contract and
third-party veriability become less important.
We consider a principal/agent model where the principal is a buyer of carbon osets
and the agent is a seller that has the option of providing the service. We assume that at
the beginning of each period parties agree on an initial baseline of tonnes of carbon dioxide
sequestered in the forest land controlled by the seller. The buyer oers a contract which
includes a payment scheme that combines a base price and a contingent payment to induce
the seller to avoid changing the land use and releasing the carbon to the atmosphere for a
period of time t. Because carbon sinks are dicult to verify we assume an imperfect enforce-
ment regime. Therefore, after accepting the contract, parities decide to adhere to or renege
on the terms of the contract. We derive the optimal contract under these circumstances and
also provide the optimal contract structure when there is perfect contract enforceability.
4When REDD contracts are perfectly enforceable, the buyer pays a xed payment to the
seller equivalent to the full cost of forest conservation including the cost of maintaining the
forest and the opportunity cost of the land use. The payment can be made at the beginning
or during period t and the seller maintains carbon stocks. This happens because a formal
mechanism enforces the contract. The buyer receives the benets of full conservation of
carbon osets and the seller gets prots equivalent to returns of the non-forest activities.
When REDD contracts are imperfectly enforceable, we assume that carbon sinks are
not third-party veriable but a the base price is perfectly enforced. The total payment under
this regimen is found to have the same total compensation as that of the perfect enforcement
regime. However, they dier in how the payment is structured. In the perfect enforcement
regime, the total payment is made in the xed payment. In the imperfect enforcement
regime, the payment is structured such as the complete payment is made as a payment that
is contingent on performance. As the xed payment does not provide the seller incentives
to perform, the optimal incentive provision in a REDD context is characterized with larger
contingent payments and xed payments closer to zero.
Furthermore, the model predicts that cooperation is negatively related to the total
cost of forest conservation, e.g. the total payment to the seller, and positively related to the
value of the carbon sinks form the contract. The higher the total cost of forest conservation
is relative to net value of the carbon sinks contracted, the harder is to sustain cooperation
and achieve forest conservation. Additionally, if the benet that the buyer accrues from the
carbon sinks delivered by the contract is close to the benets of getting carbon credits from
alternative sources, cooperation is also dicult to sustain. In these cases, self-enforcement
requires both parties to have suciently high valuation of the future so that it is optimal to
cooperate.
This paper is of interest because it serves the objective of generating new ideas to
tackle the described issues and for drawing conclusions about the optimal contract design
5to guarantee participation of private sellers and mutual self-enforcement of participants, a
necessary condition to ensuring long-term performance of carbon sequestration when formal
institutions to enforce contracts may be unavailable. These ideas will also benet practi-
tioners charged with implementing carbon sequestration contracts around the world and of
academic interest as the eld of relational contracting is still evolving and has not studied
many of the practical barriers described in the REDD context.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two discusses some relevant details
about REDD and the use of relational contracts as a potential tool to overcome some of the
issues related to the REDD characteristics. Section three presents the relational contracts
model in the context of REDD. Section four presents the benchmark case of perfectly en-
forceable contracts. Section ve derives the optimal relational contract and discusses the
sustainability of self-enforcement under a REDD context. Finally, section six presents some
conclusions and future extension of this work.
2 Highlights of REDD and the Potential for Relational
Contracts
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is conceptualized as
a cost-eective climate change mitigation mechanism (Kindermann et al., 2008; Sohngen and
Beach, 2008) that is based on the idea of rewarding individuals, communities or countries
that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from forests (compared with a reference level).
REDD produces additional environmental benets including biodiversity conservation and
watershed protection (Pagiola, Bishop, and Landell-Mills, 2002) and may also be a potential
source for social benets such as poverty reduction (Angelsen, 2008). However, because of
the nature of carbon sinks and the absence of a well-established market for carbon osets,
several issues arise as potential challenges for the successful implementation of an eective
6REDD mechanism. The challenges include various technical, nancial and institutional
considerations.
First, REDD is conceived as a multi-level mechanism which includes international and
national actors that interact through a payment scheme for environmental services (An-
gelsen, 2008). At the international level, the buyers are those who seek to earn credits
within the framework of multinational agreements as part of voluntary reduction schemes or
compliance markets, or cooperation agencies such as the Forest carbon Partnership Facility
of the World Bank that seek to reach climate goals, while the sellers are those environmental
service providers such as national or local organizations/governments. The signing of a large
agreement between a carbon credit buyer and government or agency promising forest conser-
vation is only the beginning of a potentially protracted struggle to ensure the initiation and
permanence of critical carbon emission mitigation eorts (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). At
the national level, governments or local agencies must entice individual land holders, usually
through many small contracts, to 1) initiate costly land use, land-use change and forestry
(LULUCF) projects and then 2) fulll the contractual promise by not disturbing the carbon
sink for many years even if, say, rising prices for forestry products or a costly family illness
makes such an action individually desirable.
The presence of multiple players and the delegation of contract implementation and
verication create several layers of principal-agent problems. Consequently, unless contracts
provide sucient incentives to all parties to participate and perform, contracts will fail to
meet the REDD goals.
A second consideration relates to the technical characteristics for an ideal mechanism
that implements REDD. The ideal mechanism would be carbon eective, cost ecient and
socially equitable. An eective mechanism results in emissions reductions that are additional
and permanent. Additionality means that carbon osets are additional to the business-









Figure 1: Land use choice with and without REDD payments
deforestation and forest degradation that would occur in the absence of such incentives.
Figure one shows the land-use choice determined by the returns from non-forest economic
activities and the payments for REDD (Pfa, Robalino, and Sanchez-Azofeifa, 2008) and
illustrates this additionality property.
The horizontal axis represents total land area where the land is ordered according to
potential returns. The land at the origin is the least productive and has the lowest returns in
productive activities such as agriculture and timber harvesting. The vertical axis represents
the monetary value and the diagonal line represents the returns from the non-forest activities
of each unit of land. The horizontal line on P represents a simplied payment for reducing
carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
In the absence of payments for forest conservation, land is deforested as long as the
returns from the alternative activity are positive. In the gure, land in the interval [Lo;LT]
generate positive returns from non-forest activities. Therefore, in the absence of any REDD
8payments, land in that interval is deforested. In contrast, land located in the interval [0;Lo]
is never deforested because the returns from the non-forest activities are non-positive.
When REDD payments are introduced, the choice concerning land-use is potentially
aected because the REDD payments oset some part of the opportunity cost of keeping
the forest in its carbon-sequestering state. Land-holders decide to maintain the forest land
if they are compensated for the forgone returns of the non-forest activity. However, only
land that is under a threat of deforestation or forest degradation generate additionality for
a REDD mechanism.
The line that goes through P in the gure represents the maximum ecient REDD
payment. The point LREDD where the REDD payment line intersects the returns of the
non-forest activities line represents where the marginal benet of REDD equals the marginal
cost of it. If a REDD payment is made to a land owner in the interval [LREDD;LT], the cost
of forest conservation is higher than the benets of the carbon sinks generated. Therefore,
REDD payments in this interval are inecient. If a REDD payment is implemented for
land in the interval [0;Lo], the payment is also inecient because land in this location
would never have been slated for forest degradation or deforestation as the returns of the
non-forest activities are not positive. Therefore, forest conservation in this land does not
generate any additional reduction from the business-as-usual scenario. Finally, a REDD
payment is ecient if it compensates land owners in the interval [Lo;LREDD] such as they
participate in forest conservation. This interval represents the additionality of the REDD
mechanism as this land is deforested in the absence of REDD payments.
The next requirement for eectiveness of REDD contracts is that the carbon osets
must be permanent. Permanence refers to fact that conserved forests should not be lost
in the future and therefore carbon sinks must exist for long periods of time. The optimal
REDD mechanisms has to give enough incentives to the land owner to keep participating
in the REDD mitigation eort in the long-term and has to compensate for changes in the
9opportunity cost of forest conservation and the cost of conservation itself. In this context, the
mechanism has to be cost ecient and achieve a given emission reduction at the minimum
cost. This means that contracts should be implemented on land that has characteristics such
as the one in the interval [Lo;LT].
Finally, a key issue for contracts that implement REDD is the capacity to monitor,
report and verify. In this context, contract enforcement is a key element for sustainabil-
ity and permanence of REDD projects. However, enforceability is very complex given the
institutional constraints. For instance, even though industrialized nations committed to
list emission reduction targets and direct funding to help developing countries at the 2009
United Nations Climate Change Conference, the \Copenhagen Accord" is not legally en-
forceable (UNFCCC, 2009). Additionally, sellers in areas with sensitive ecosystems are of
particular interest because their eorts may yield greater marginal benets. However, many
of these sellers reside in countries where contracts are dicult to enforce due to lack of formal
courts, a weak institutional framework or high costs of enforcement. Furthermore, eort and
outcomes described in such contracts including important technical aspects from REDD are
dicult to monitor and verify.
While such contracts may be crucial in implementing REDD policies, little is known
about how such contracts can be structured to maximize the likelihood of seller partici-
pation and performance, particularly for long-term contracts featuring credit-constrained
sellers in environments where contracts may be dicult to monitor and enforce. Because the
limitations and characteristics of the context under which REDD contracts have to be imple-
mented, an explicit contract would be incomplete and dicult for a third-party to enforce.
Therefore, REDD contracts need to be self-enforcing; i.e., sellers must perform because the
contract is structured in a way where contractual performance (forest conservation) is in
their personal best interest. Without carbon payments, sellers adopt those land use and
management practices that maximize economic returns. Therefore, the contract has to give
10incentives to sellers to choose forest conservation as part of their optimization program.
The power of relational contracts comes from the emergence of informal enforcement
mechanisms that support incentives even when explicit contracts are incomplete. Relational
contracts (also called self-enforcing contracts) rely upon the concept that, when parties are
involved repeatedly in a relationship, the promise of future payos can sustain performance
today while the threat of termination can serve as a partial substitute for explicit incentives
in disciplining rent seeking, hold-ups and underinvestment problems. In the case of REDD, as
buyers of carbon credits promise to pay for the performance of the suppliers today, tomorrow
and so on, the suppliers look at their stream of future payos and have incentives to maintain
forest stocks and reduce degradation. In the next section a rst step is taken to apply the
relational contract framework to a REDD environment.
3 The Model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, a buyer and a seller who have the opportunity to trade
carbon emissions osets at dates t = 0;1;2;3:::. Trading can be on an international or on a
national level. If trading is on an international level the buyer may be attempting to comply
with obligations to reduce GHG emissions, e.g., governments of industrialized countries or
an international agency such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank
acting as an intermediary. The seller may be governments of developing countries, local
governments or project developers and NGOs interested in reducing carbon emissions. If
trading is on a national level the buyer may be the government of the recipient country, a
local government or project developers and NGOs. The seller could be an individual land-
owner, farmer or local community or government who has the possibility of maintaining
carbon stocks for specic periods of time.
The seller possesses forest land and is interested in adopting the land use and man-
11agement practices that maximizes her economic returns. She has the option to conserve the
forest and maintain the carbon stocks or she can change the land use to a non-forest activ-
ity such as agricultural and timber harvesting resulting in carbon emissions. The buyer is
interested in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation. Thus,
he is willing to pay the seller to avoid changing the current land use and to maintain the
carbon stock captured in the forest for a given period of time. Because carbon stocks only
have value if they stay for a long enough period of time, date t is the period of time that the
buyer wants the seller to keep the current land use. For instance, if the buyer is interested
in the provision of carbon stocks for ve years then period t lasts ve years.
The buyer is interested in the additionality and permanence of carbon osets to comply
with REDD objectives, thus he oers a seller a contract to achieve these objectives. Figure
two shows the timing of actions and decisions. At the beginning of period t, the buyer and
the seller agree on a initial baseline of tonnes of carbon stocked in the forest land owned
by the seller. Once the initial carbon stock baseline is established, the buyer proposes a
compensation scheme to the seller that she is entitled to if she does not change the land-use
and deliver the quantity of tonnes of carbon initially agreed, q. Compensation consists
of a xed payment pt and a contingent payment bt : Q ! <, where Q is the observed
tonnes of carbon. Carbon stocks are observable by both parties but they are not enforceable
because carbon stocks are not veriable by a neutral third-party either because a formal
court does not have the technology and means for veriability or because it is too costly
to verify. Consequently, the desired tonnes of carbon, q, may dier from the delivered
quantity, qt. Let qt 2 Q = [q;q] denote the set of tonnes of carbon delivered in period t,
where q represents the tonnes of carbon dioxide sequestered at the beginning of the period
given the initial land use. q represents the quantity of tonnes of carbon sequestered when
the land use is completely changed to a non-forest activity.
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Figure 2: Timing line
the course of the trading period t. Because pt is formally enforced, when it is paid becomes
less important. However, having a xed payment at the beginning of or during the period
may more attractive for sellers who depend absolutely on the contract compensation as
period t may last for long periods of time. The contingent payment is considered as a bonus
and it is used to reward complying with the baseline and avoiding deforestation and forest
degradation. Since the contingency payment depends on an unveriable measure, it is not a
legally binding obligation.
After observing the compensation scheme, the seller decides whether or not to accept
the buyer's oer and her decision set is given by dt 2 f0;1g. If the seller accepts, she receives
p, observes the returns of alternative land uses including non-forest activities and decides to
adhere to the contract or to change the land use and breach the contract.
If she decides to avoid deforestation and forest degradation, she performs under the
contract and incurs a cost for forest protection. The cost includes aspects of maintaining
the initial state of the forest land such as the seller's opportunity cost of time of taking care
of the forest, the cost of materials for instance to build a fence around the property, or task
diculty which includes making sure other people do not exploit the forest. The cost is given
13by ct(qt) where c0(:) > 0, c00(:)  0, and c(q) = 0. The seller's prot is Ut = Pt(qt)   ct(qt),
where Pt(qt) = pt+bt(qt) is the total payment actually made from the buyer to the seller. At
the end of period t and upon delivery, the sellers's carbon stock generates a direct benet for
the buyer, Vt(qt), where V 0(:) > 0, V 00(:)  0, and V (q) = 0. He also chooses whether or not
to pay bt(qt). The buyer's prots are given by t = Vt(qt) Pt(qt). Also, V 0(:) > c0(:) 8 q 2 Q,
so it is socially ecient and Pareto optimal to maintain the forest land and trade q = q,
since q maximizes the total joint surplus dened by S(qt) = V (qt)   c(qt).
If the seller rejects the contract, trade does not occur, the seller receives the value
of the non-forest activity u and the buyer receives  which is equivalent to the alternative
source of carbon credits. These options are assumed to be less attractive than trading, but
are desirable to the parties if there are insucient incentives for the parties to trade. The
sum of the xed payos, s = u+, is the social value of the outside options. The net social
surplus is given by S(qt) s, where S(qt) s > 0 8 q 2 (q;q], and S(q) > S(q)  0. The net
social surplus is the dierence between the return to the relationship and the second-best
market opportunity for both parties.
This sequence of events repeats in each period t, and over the course of repeated
interactions the parties know only the past actions of the trading partners with whom they
have traded allowing for the creation of relationships in which cooperation is an important
characteristic. In addition, the party's objective is to maximize the future discounted stream
of payments, where the common discount factor is  2 (0;1].
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where dt = 1 if the seller accepts the contract and trade occurs in period t, and dt = 0 if the
seller rejects and no trade occurs.
4 Optimal REDD Contract Under Perfect Enforceabil-
ity
If carbon stocks were perfectly third-party veriable and therefore contractible, the contract
could explicitly include the quantity of tonnes of carbon and a single xed payment in ex-
change of the carbon delivered. Contingent payments are not necessary because a formal
court enforces the contract. If parties breach the contract, they will incur a formal penalty
assumed large enough to motivate performance. Consequently, the buyer proposes a contract
dened as yt = hPt;qti that maximizes his stream of future payos subject to the participa-
tion of the seller in the contract. The seller accepts the contract and avoids deforestation and
forest degradation if and only if the benets he obtained from the contract U are greater
than the returns she obtains in other alternative land use activities. This situation is given
by inequality 3:
U = Pt   c(qt)  u: (3)
The left-hand side represents the seller's expected gains from the contract. She receives
Pt in exchange of avoiding changing the land use and incurs in a cost for forest conservation.
The right-hand side represents the expected returns of the seller if the contract is not signed
15and she chooses land-uses other than forest conservation following business-as-usual. The
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subject to P = u + c(q) (4)
and q 2 [q;q]:
Substituting the seller's participation constraint into the buyer's prot option, we obtain the
following rst order condition:
V
0(q) = c0(q) (5)
Because V 0(:) > c0(:) 8 q 2 Q it is socially ecient and Pareto optimal to maintain the forest
land and trade q = q. The optimal contract is given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. If REDD contracts are perfectly enforceable, the buyer pays a xed payment
to the seller equal to P = u+c(q) during date t, the seller maintains the carbon stocks, and
each party gets prots:

 =








A formal mechanism enforces the optimal contract which implements full conservation
of the forest land. The buyer obtains the net benets of the carbon sink's storage in the
forest. The seller receives a payment equivalent to the discounted value of the returns of the
16alternative land use including for instance agricultural and timber harvesting.
5 Relational Contracts and REDD
The nature of carbon stocks suggests that they are observable by the parties involved in a
contract but not veriable by a neutral third-party. In this case, parties must rely upon
relational contracting as a private enforcement mechanism. This means that parties rely
on informal incentives and good faith to self-enforce agreements. However, the contingent
payments are just a promise, therefore parties have the temptation to deviate from the
contract as they do not incur in a formal penalty for reneging the original agreement.
If parties were to interact just one time, the buyer can only make the xed payment
credible as it is paid during the trading period. Because this payment does not include any
additional incentives to the seller to continue to sequester the carbon, avoiding carbon emis-
sions from reducing deforestation and forest degradation cannot occur in a static equilibrium.
Consequently, trade does not occur and both parties receive their outside options.
In contrast, the ongoing interaction sustains the equilibrium by allowing the parties to
support future terms of trade contingent on the satisfactory performance of present trade.
The parties cooperate if the history of play in all periods has been cooperation, where
cooperation is dened as both parties fullling the contract. The parties break-o trade
forever if any deviation is observed. There is no loss of assuming that deviation causes the
parties to break-o trade forever because this outcome never happens in equilibrium (Levin,
2003). Furthermore, it can be assumed that after any deviation parties behave as they would
in one-time interactions in which the buyer oers a contract in which there is no performance
incentives and the seller responds by changing the land use. In this setting, this assumption
reects the fact that it takes a long period of time to recuperate the forest land if the seller
deviates via deforestation. Therefore the buyer will not be interested in trading with such a
17seller anymore as she does not have carbon sinks to oer. On the other hand, if the buyer
deviates, the seller looses trust in the buyer and responds by changing the land use to a
non-forest activity. Again, carbon sinks are destroyed along with the opportunity of future
trade.
Additionally, parties cannot renegotiate the trading decision after carbon sinks are
observed. The reason for this is that if a self-enforcing contract is optimal given any history,
then the contract is strongly optimal. This strongly optimal contract has the property that
parties cannot jointly gain from renegotiating a new self-enforcing contract even o the
equilibrium path. A behavior o the equilibrium path implies deviation. Following the same
argument as before, if either party deviates, carbon sinks are destroyed and with them the
social surplus. Therefore there is not gain from renegotiation.
Finally, each period is played following a Nash equilibrium and parties use a stationary
contract, in which the buyer always oers the same payment scheme, the seller always
takes the same action, and the rents to the relationship are attractive enough for parties
to self-enforce the contract and stay in the relationship (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy,
1994; MacLeod, 2006; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1998). Moreover, repetition allows
players to maintain a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) where parties honor
the contract and maintain long-term relationships. Last, because the buyer's behavior is
perfectly observable, a stationary contract delivers the optimal surplus and the reduction of
carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
These assumptions allow for self-enforcing contracts | relational contracts | since it
contains a complete plan for the relationship that describes behavior on and o the equi-
librium path. On the equilibrium path, both parties fulll the contract, the seller avoids
deforestation and forest degradation and incurs the cost of forest conservation. The buyer
pays the full payment Pt(qt) = pt + bt(qt) and gets the benets of the carbon stocks. If the
seller breaches the contract, she does not incur in the cost of forest conservation and changes
18the land-use to a non-forest activity. Then, she receives p and the returns of the non-forest
activity u and the buyer receives nothing. In this case, the parties break o trade forever.
In the context of REDD, the contract described above can be explained as follows.
A buyer promises a seller to pay pt at the beginning of the period plus a bonus, bt(qt),
conditioned on the seller's satisfactory carbon sequestration action. The seller can choose
to shirk or conserve the forest by putting the necessary time (eort) and making sure the
forest remains intact to deliver the same carbon stocks from the baseline. If she decides to
provide the carbon stock, at the delivery date, since the tonnes are not veriable by a third
party, the buyer has to decide to fulll the initial agreement or to shirk. If he honors the
agreement he pays bt(qt) additional to the p he paid already, then trade continues overtime.
If he decides to shirk then he can argue that the carbon sinks delivered are dierent from
the baseline they agree on, and therefore pay bt(qt) = 0.
5.1 Characterization of Self-enforcing Contracts
Because third-party enforcement is imperfect, the buyer must oer a contract y = hp;b(q)i
through which he provides additional incentives for the seller to avoid deforestation and forest
degradation. The buyer pays p as a xed payment regardless of what the seller's performance
is, and the contingent payment takes the form of a bonus that the buyer promises to pay as
long as the seller does not shirk. Because enforcement is imperfect after the seller accepts a
contract y
p, parties may renege without a formal penalty. The seller decides on how to use
the land and it may dier from the desired use induced by the contingent payment rule in
the contract. She can cooperate and choose qt  q, or can shirk by choosing a non-forest
activity.
The buyer, after observing the tonnes of carbon delivered, may cooperate by paying
Pt(qt) = pt+bt(qt). Or he may renege the contract by choosing the most protable deviation,
reneging on the payment of the bonus, b(q) = 0. The buyer participates in the REDD
19contract if the benets from such contract are greater than his alternative source of carbon
reduction. This is given by
V (q)   p   b(q)   (8)
In addition, the buyer's oer has to meet the seller's individual rationality constraint,
i.e., the oer has to provide a credible incentive to perform over the course of time. Because
of the imperfect enforcement a dynamic incentive compatibility constraint (DICC) for each
party has to be fullled to self-enforce the contracts. The DICC is necessary to reach the
optimal contract because it requires the parties to prefer to behave according to the contract
instead of reneging. The seller's and the buyer's DICC are given by (9) and (10) respectively.
A seller cooperates if and only if:
p + b(q)   c(q)
1   




The left hand side is the discounted payo of the seller for cooperating and maintaining
the carbon stock qt  q at the end of each date t. It represents the discounted gains from
the relationship for the seller. She receives p during period t and the contingent payment
b(q) after delivering the carbon stocks established in the contract and she incurs the forest
conservation costs. The right hand side represents the payo if she shirks. Note that the
most protable deviation for the seller is to change the land-use and to not incur in any
cost for forest conservation but in this case the principal, after observing the carbon stocks
delivered, will not pay the bonus. If the seller does so, she incurs in c(q), receives the p and
changes the land use to an alternative activity. Therefore, she collects the benets from the
alternative activity starting on period t = 0 and therefore, receives the present value of the
returns from the non-forest activity for all periods.
20Additionally, participation for the buyer in the long-term relationship is optimal if
his DICC given by (10) is satised. A buyer cooperates if and only if the left hand side
payments from cooperation are greater than the right hand side payments from deviation.
If he cooperates he gets the long-term benets of the carbon stocks delivered net of the
payments he makes. If he deviates he gets the benets of the carbon storage minus what he
paid upfront. Then in all future periods, he guarantees himself the benets of the alternative
options for carbon credits.
V (q)   p   b(q)
1   




A contract is self-enforceable if the parties nd cooperation to be the optimal strategy.
For instance, in REDD contracts, the long-term returns from the current relationship have
to be at least as good as the present value of the returns from other alternative uses of land
so that the seller remains trading with the same buyer, and vice versa. Then, since both
parties can deviate from the contract, the contingent payment must be sucient to ensure
a self-enforcing contract. It follows that the compensation scheme is bounded by the future
gains of the relationship.




V (q)   p   b(q)
1   
)
subject to p + b(q) = u + c(q); (11)
p+b(q) c(q)
1   p   c(q) + u
1 ;
V (q) p b(q)
1   V (q)   p + 
1 ;
and q 2 [q;q]:
21The seller's IRC can be rearrange as
p  u + c(q)   b(q) (12)
and expression (9) can be restated as,
p  c(q) +
c(q)   c(q) + u   b(q)

(13)
which gives the lower bound on the xed payment, p, for inducing long-term seller coop-
eration. The presence of the performance payment allows the buyer to oer a lower xed
payment. By substituting (12) in (13), the optimal distribution of the total compensation
among the xed payment and the performance bonus is established. The optimal stationary
REDD contract is dened in Proposition (2).
Proposition 2. If contract enforcement is imperfect and parties repeatedly interact, and
assuming  high enough, an optimal stationary REDD contract hp;b(q)i that implements
conservation of the forest land q, must satisfy (3),(8), (9), and (10), where (3) and (10)
bind, and the compensation scheme is characterized by:
b(q)  c(q)   c(q) + u , (14)
p = c(q) , and (15)
p + b(q) = u + c(q): (16)
Equality (16) identies the total compensation that the buyer oers the seller in the
contract. Equality (16) gives the xed payment that the seller receives during date t and
22equality (14) gives the size of the bonus that the buyer promises to pay at the end of the
period to induce the seller to not change the land-use.
Recalling the assumptions about the cost of forest conservation, c(q) = 0, the xed
payment included in the optimal REDD contract is equal to zero. That means that under
the optimal relational contract the seller does not get pay anything upfront or during the
time she is under the contract until the end of period. The contingent payment includes the
complete payment to the seller. It includes the cost of providing optimal forest conservation
and the opportunity cost of the alternative land use. This is intuitive because the seller
knows the strategy of the buyer. If she deviates from the contract and changes the use of
land, the buyer does not pay the performance payment and furthermore he does not do
business again with her. As a consequence she cannot get any future benets from the
relationship. This happens even with the smallest change in the land use as the carbon
sinks dier from the baseline established at the beginning of the period and renegotiation
is not possible under the assumptions of the optimal relational contract. Therefore, if the
seller deviates from the contract she chooses the most protable actions which include not
incurring any cost for forest conservation and converting all land to agricultural or timber
activities. Because an ex ante xed payment does not give incentives to the seller to remain
in the relationship as it is not conditioned on performance, the buyer needs to provide large
enough additional incentives to the seller to perform under imperfect veriability of carbon
sinks. Moreover, because the contingent payments are limited by the future gains from the
relationship and because the buyer's prot decreases when the xed payment is positive,
then all compensation is shifted to the contingent payment so that the seller has enough
incentives to perform.
The result is highlighted in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. For imperfect enforcement regimes, all compensation is paid as a perfor-
mance payment upon delivery of the carbon sinks, and the payment is weakly increasing on
23the returns of alternative activities and the full cost of forest conservation.
The total compensation is weakly increasing in the returns of non-forest activities and
the cost of forest conservation because the contingent payment is limited by the gains from
the relationship. If the returns of other activities or the cost of conserving the land are
too high, then the future gains from the relationship may not be enough to provide enough
incentives to the parties to perform and self-enforce the contract. Furthermore, the payment
in the contract represents the cost of forest conservation under a REDD contract.
5.2 Sustainability of Self-enforcing Contracts
Self-enforcing contracts are sustainable if parties nd the optimal strategy is to cooperate
in every period. The cooperation decision depends on each party's discounted payo stream
from the contract. The discounted payo stream represents the value of the relationship and
depends on how much each party values the future relative to the present (discount factor).
If parties hold a very low discount factor,  near to zero, the value of the relationship shrinks
and it becomes less attractive to comply with the obligations of the contract. Therefore, it
is more dicult to sustain cooperation and enforce contracts privately. As a consequence,
social eciency is potentially oset by the lack of formal enforcement.
In the case of the optimal REDD contract described in Proposition 2, parties nd
cooperation (self enforcement) to be the best strategy if they value the future relationship
enough. The valuation is given by each party's dynamic incentive compatibility constraints.
Combining the dynamic constraints for both parties given by (9) and (10) yields the discount
factor necessary to achieve cooperation under the optimal REDD contract.
Proposition 3. Let  > 0. Cooperation under the optimal REDD contract is achievable
8  2 [;1), where  =
c(q) c(q)+u
V (q) c(q) .
Proposition 3 reports the range of discount factors that can support a cooperative
24equilibrium under the optimal REDD contract. It predicts that parties that have a discount
factor greater or equal to the parameter  will cooperate in the REDD context.
Recalling again the assumption that c(q) = 0, the parameter  can be rewritten as
 =
c(q) + u
V (q)   
(17)
The term in the numerator includes the total payment the buyer has to make to the seller to
avoid carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The payment represents
the full cost of forest conservation under a REDD contract. The denominator represents the
value of the carbon sinks from the contract. That is, the value of the carbon sinks under
contract for the buyer net of the outside option to get carbon credits from an alternative
source.
The higher the total payment is relative to the net value of the carbon sinks in the
contract the closer to one is the discount factor needed to maintain cooperation. As a
consequence, only parties who value the future nearly as much as the present nd cooperation
to be the optimal strategy.
A high discount factor threshold emerges when it is too costly for the seller to conserve
the forest or if the returns of the non-forest activity are too high. The latter implies a higher
opportunity cost for the land use which also relates to the seller's cost of forest conservation.
This happens because the land becomes more attractive to other parties who will try to get
the returns of the non-forest activity. Therefore, it will be more costly for the seller to make
sure the forest land is not deforested or degraded by other parties.
On the other hand, for any given REDD payment, when the benet that the buyer
accrues from the carbon sinks delivered by the contract is similar to the benets of getting
carbon credits from other alternative sources, the discount factor needed for cooperation
25is also very high and cooperation is harder to sustain. Accordingly, contract sustainability
requires that both parties have suciently high discount factors to prevent any party from
shirking on contract obligations and to continue cooperation.
In contrast, the lower the cost of forest conservation is relative to the dierence of
returns from the tonnes of carbon delivered under the contract and the alternative source of
carbon credits, the smaller is the discount factor need to self-enforce the contract. In these
situations, REDD contracts are more likely to achieve their objective.
6 Concussions and Future Extensions
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation has been identied as a cost-
eective measure to mitigate global climate change. However, REDD contract implementa-
tion is challenging because of technical, nancial and institutional consideration, including
the nature of carbon sinks regarding to veriability and monitoring. These elements make
contract enforceability a key issue for the implementation of a REDD mechanism. Previ-
ous research on REDD contracts assumes that there exists some probability of enforcement
(Palmer, Ohndorf, and MacKenzie, 2009). However, because the multiple institutional frame-
works in which REDD is potentially embedded, this may not be the case. In this paper, we
propose the use of informal incentives and good faith as key elements to enforce contracts
and overcome incomplete enforcement. We have characterized the optimal REDD contract
and shown how the optimal level of incentive provision is characterized. We have also derived
the parameters under which self-enforcement and cooperation are sustainable.
In the benchmark case, where contracts are fully enforced by a formal court, we have
shown that the buyer achieves optimal forest conservation and the seller participate in the
contract when the seller is paid the opportunity cost of the land and the cost of forest
conservation. The total payment includes a single xed payment that can be made at any
26time during the trading period because it is formally enforced.
More interestingly, when contract enforcement is lacking, the model predicts that the
optimal contract includes a payment structure in which the xed payment is set to zero
and the contingent payment includes the total value of the compensation. As the xed
payment does not provide the seller incentives to perform, the optimal incentive provision in
a REDD context is characterized with larger contingent payments and the absence of xed
payments. Furthermore, we show that cooperation is dicult to sustain when the total cost
of forest conservation is too high relative to net value of the carbon sinks contracted, and
when the benet that the buyer accrues from the carbon sinks delivered by the contract is
close to the benets of getting carbon credits from alternative sources. As a consequence,
self-enforcement requires both parties to have suciently high discount factors and REDD
goals are more dicult to achieve.
This paper takes a rst step to apply the relational contract framework to a REDD
environment. The results provide insights on the power of informal enforcement mechanisms
that support incentives even when REDD explicit contracts are incomplete. Thus, there
are several issues that need to be incorporated in future extensions of this work to reect
additional particulars of REDD. Such extensions include the presence of credit constrained
sellers, moral hazard and adverse selection, stochastic variation of the alternative land-use,
subjective and objective performance, as well as the existence of delegation and monitoring
issues.
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